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Abstract. In this paper, we study the optimal number of active firms in a
coalition and in a merger. We consider two kinds of game : a merger game
and a coalition game, both in the context of price competition with horizontal
product differentiation. These are two-stage games. The first stage consists
of determining the number of active firms; the second stage is price compe-
tition between active firms. Firms belonging to the same owner or to the
same coalition play cooperatively between themselves but face competition
between other firms.
We show that when there is no competitive pressure (i.e. no outside firm)
then only merged equilibria can occur in the merger case. In the coalition
case we obtain a similar result in which the number of active firms in the
second stage is less than the initial number of firms.
Moreover we show that if competitive pressure is high enough then the
initial number of firms in the industry is the same as the number of active
firms in the last stage for each kind of game.
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1 Introduction
In their seminal paper (1983), Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (SSR) [8] have
shown that a merger in a standard Cournot framework with linear demand
and linear costs is not profitable unless a large majority of the relevant firms
are involved in the merger (80 %). This is so because outsiders benefit more
than the firms participating in the merger, the "insiders". Since production
costs are linear, any coalition of firms is indifferent to how total production
is divided between the members of the coalition, so that every coalition of
firms behaves as if it were a single firm.
Perry and Porter (1985) [7] but also Farrell and Shapiro (1990) [3] have
challenged the view that a merged firm is no larger than any of the constituent
firms. These papers introduce the existence of some crucial assets that are in
limited supply in order to capture the notion that some firms are larger than
others in a homogeneous product industry. This assumption implies rising
marginal cost of output production and, consequently, internal cost savings
from mergers could make a merger profitable.
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) [2] have found an opposite result in the
case of price competition with differentiated products so that a merger is
always beneficial for the insiders.
Kamien and Zang (1990) [6] have explored the possibility of endogenous
monopolization of a homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly through one
firm’s acquisition of the others. They adopt two different approaches; first,
an analysis of a centralized game : an owner who has acquired several firms
behaves as one entity (as in SSR, 1983). Secondly, they explore the possibility
for an owner, possessing several firms, to choose the optimal number of active
firms, each of them competing between themselves, this being a decentralized
game. More precisely, in this kind of game, they emphasize that an owner,
possessing several firms, chooses to operate more than one firm. They show
that, for the two kinds of game, monopolization can only occur in industries
composed ex-ante of a small number of firms. Moreover, in the centralized
game (SSR context (1983)) with a large number of firms, merged equilibria
(that means the number of active firms is fewer than the initial number of
firms) are non-existent. This confirms and strengthens the SSR’s results
(1983).
More recent literature takes into account strategic delegation (Gonzalez-
Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) [4] or Ziss (2001) [9]) to study merger prof-
itability. What differs from the decentralized game in Kamien and Zang
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(1990) [6] is the two types of competition : in production and also in the re-
muneration of managers. Delegation increases competition between entities
inside the firm. Consequently, the incentives to merge and the profitability of
merger, under delegation, are considerably increased in stark contrast to the
position where there is no delegation. Ziss (2001) [9] argues that a merger
will result in the merged entity operating only one firm.
Commitment through delegation may be limited by the possible renego-
tiation of the delegation contract in the absence of a strong enforcing insti-
tutional setting avoiding false disclosure and private renegotiation. Precom-
mitment effects seem to rest on the crucial assumption that contracts, once
publicly disclosed, cannot be secretly renegotiated. This is at odds with real-
ity: whether legally enforceable or of a more implicit nature, actual contracts
can almost always be renegotiated if both parties agree (Caillaud, Jullien and
Picard, 1995 [1]). In the same way, in the decentralized game of Kamien and
Zang (1990) [6], internal competition is not rational because if contracts were
renegotiable ex-post, firms may act cooperatively. In our model, we consider
that firms belonging to the same owner play in a cooperative way.
Our purpose is twofold; first, we analyse the incentives to merge in the
context of price competition with horizontal product differentiation. We
suppose a two stage game. In the first stage, an owner possessing several firms
chooses the number of active firms. The second stage is price competition
between active firms.
The number of active firms plays a major rôle : since products are hor-
izontally differentiated, demand increases with the number of active firms.
This means that a merger can gain market share, but equilibrium price is
lower. Active firms create internal competition but reinforce competition
with other firms at the same time.
We show that if the market structure of the industry is duopoly then
only merged equilibria can occur. This means that only equilibria in which
an owner of several firms chooses to let less active firms than he owns exist.
Moreover, if the competitive pressure is high enough then merged equilibria
can not occur in this game.
Second, we analyse cartel stability in a static case. As previously we
consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, each coalition has to decide the
number of its active firms but contrary to the merger game, non active firms
are not closed, they receive the same profits as active firms. In the second
stage only active firms make price competition.
We show that total cartelization of the industry is an equilibrium of this
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game, which is in contrast with the results obtained by Kamien and Zang
(1990) [6].
A major difference exists between these two games. In the merger game,
one owner can possess several firms; whereas in the second game, several
firms can belong to a same coalition but each firm in a coalition belongs to
one owner.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic
model. Characterizations of equilibria are provided in section 3. Concluding
remarks follow in section 4. Proofs of results appear in the appendix.
2 The model
We consider the following utility function derived from Ha¨ckner (2000) [5]:
U(q, I) =
n∑
i=1
qi − 1
2
[
n∑
i=1
q2i + 2γ
∑
i6=j
(qiqj)
]
+ I (1)
The parameter γ ∈ [0,1] is a measure of the substitutability between
products. Utility is quadratic in the consumption of the n horizontally dif-
ferentiated products and linear in the consumption of other goods: I, which
price is normalized to one.
The demand function is given by:
qi(pi, pj, n) =
1
1 + γ(n− 1)
[
1− 1 + γ(n− 2)
1− γ pi +
γ
1− γ
∑
j 6=i
pj
]
(2)
We assume that entry into the industry is difficult and that each producer
operates at a constant and identical marginal and average cost (c). Without
loss of generality, we assume that c = 0. All the relevant variables and
strategies available to the firms are common knowledge.
We posit an initial industry consisting of 16 identical and independent
firms.
Let us now turn to the formal description of our two games.
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MERGER GAME
• Stage 1: Number of active firms.
Let Kj be the number of firms owned by a merged entity Mj (firms be-
longing to a same owner have been previously purchased by this owner)
and Z, the number of outside firms which are firms not belonging to a
merged entity Mj.
Each owner decides the number of his firms which are active.
Let kj (0≤kj≤Kj) be the number of active firms within Mj.
A SPNE (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium) in the merger game is
said to be merged if the number of firms operated by all owners is fewer
than the initial number of firms .
• Stage 2: Price competition.
Firms belonging to the same owner act cooperatively amongst one an-
other but face competition with each other. The active firms in the
merged entities (Mj) and the outside firms compete in price.
COALITION GAME
• Stage 1 : Number of active firms.
Each coalition Cj owning Kj independent firms decides the number of
its active firms, denoted by kj. Contrary to the merger stage, non active
firms (they do not compete at the competition stage) are not closed.
For example those firms can receive an allowance from the active firms.
We assume that firms, active or passive, receive the same individual
profit which is the total profit of the coalition shared in a equal way
between the members of the coalition. Also, let Z be the number of
firms not belonging to a coalition.
• Stage 2 : Price competition.
As in the merger case, active firms in coalition and the outside firms
compete in price. Firms belonging to the same coalition act coopera-
tively amongst one another but face competition with each other.
We then characterize pure strategy SPNE of these two games.
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3 Analysis of equilibria
This section characterizes the set of equilibria depending on the kind of game
in question : merger or coalition.
3.1 Merger case
We analyse successively the case in which two owners have previously bought
some firms : the owners M1 and M2, owning respectively K1 and K2 firms,
and after the situation where only one owner has previously bought firms.
3.1.1 Two mergers
In this section, we consider the case in which two owners, denoted by M1
and M2 own K1 and K2 firms (Ki ≥ 1,∀i = 1, 2). Each of them operates k1
and k2 units respectively. There are Z outside firms.
M1, M2 and the outside firms simultaneously choose the product price for
each of their firm whilst seeking to maximize their profit.
lemma 1. Equilibrium prices of the two mergers (p∗1 and p∗2) and the out-
siders (p∗) is given by the following three functions :
p∗1=
(1−γ)(2+2(Z−1)γ+2γk1+γk2)(2+(2Z−3)γ+2γ(k1+k2))
A
p∗2=
(1−γ)(2+(2Z−3)γ+2γ(k1+k2))(2+2(Z−1)γ+γ(k1+2k2))
A
p∗= (1−γ)(2+2(Z−1)γ+2γk1+γk2)(2+2(Z−1)γ+γ(k1+2k2))
A
with
A = 2γ2k21(4− 4γ + 3Zγ + 3γk2) + 2(1 + (Z − 1)γ + γk2)(2(2 + (Z − 3)γ)(1 +
(Z − 1)γ) + γ(4− 4γ + 3Zγ)k2) + γk1(2(8 + 5(Z − 2)γ)(1 + (Z − 1)γ) + γk2(22−
25γ + 17Zγ + 6γk2)).
We check that A > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equilibrium profit of the merged entity M1 is given by:
piM1 =
1
(1 + γ(k1 + k2 + Z − 1))A2 (1− γ)k1(1 + (Z − 1)γ + γk2)
(2 + 2(Z − 1)γ + 2γk1 + γk2)2(2 + (2Z − 3)γ + 2γ(k1 + k2))2 (3)
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The expression for merger M2 is symmetrical.
We now determine if an owner of several firms will choose to close some
of them or to keep all of them active.
proposition 1.
• If Z≥2 then merged equilibria can not occur in this game.
• If Z<2 the game can result in merged equilibria depending on product
substitutability. Merged equilibria can occur when there is little product
differentiation.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The existence of merged equilibria depends on the number of outsiders.
Precisely, the presence of outsiders increases competitive pressure, so that
when the number of outsiders is high enough (Z ≥ 2), an owner of several
firms will not close some of them to maintain market power.
In the remainder of this paper, we assume γ = 0.9 in order to consider all
the different cases (merged or unmerged equilibria).
The objective now is to analyse if the number of firms owned by each
owner influences the number of their active firms.
The reaction function of the merger M1 is defined as k∗1(k2).
lemma 2. The reaction function of the merger M1 is given by :
k∗1(k2, Z) =

K1 if Z > 1, ∀k2
f(k2) < K1 if Z = 1 and k2 ≥ 8
K1 if Z = 1 and k2 < 8
g(k2) if Z = 0
Proof of this is obtained by numerical simulation. Appendix C discloses
exact values of functions f and g as well as values of profit functions.
The reaction function of the merger K2 is a symmetrical function of
k∗1(k2).
We observe that k∗1(k2) is a decreasing function, so k1 and k2 are strategic
substitutes.
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lemma 3.
• If there is not competitive pressure (Z = 0), then the owner of several
firms will choose to close some of its firms if the other owner keeps all
his firms active.
• It competitive pressure is strong enough (Z > 1) then neither of the
two owners will close firms.
• If there is only one outside firm, one owner will choose to close some of
his firms only if the other owner lets all his firms continue to be active.
proposition 2. If the market structure of the industry is a duopoly then only
merged equilibria can occur.
3.1.2 One merger
In this section, we interject a second course in which only the owner M1 has
previously bought some firms and can close some of his firms. The game is
solved as previously.
We obtain the following proposition :
proposition 3. If the market structure of the industry is complete or one of
partial monopolization then no merged equilibria can occur.
So whatever the number of outsiders is, only unmerged equilibria occur.
3.2 Coalition case
In this section, we analyse the equilibria of the game considering successively
the case of two and one coalitions.
3.2.1 Two coalitions
We create two coalitions in this game and we test for stability. The two
coalitions and the outsiders choose their price simultaneously in order to
maximize their profit. This is exactly the same as in the merger case. It
follows that Lemma 1, Proposition 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 are satisified
for the coalition game as well.
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Now we have to determine equilibria structures for the industry in ques-
tion. For this we test for internal and external stability for each possible
market structure.
Recall that external stability requires that firms inside do not find it de-
sirable to exit and internal stability that firms outside do not find it desirable
to enter.
proposition 4. Only two coalition structures are stable :
K∗1 = 7, K
∗
2 = 7, Z = 2
1
{K1 > 0,K2 > 0}/K∗1 +K∗2 = 16
Proof. See Appendix D.
The second structure corresponds to the case of maximal concentration
in the industry which is in contrast with the results obtained by Kamien and
Zang (1990) [6]. In this case (Z = 0), one of the two coalitions will allow
all its firms to continue to be active whereas the other will allow fewer firms
that he owns to remain active. 2
proposition 5. Maximal concentration in the industry is an equilibrium of
this game and corresponds to the case of one coalition which allows all its
firms to be active whereas the other not.
3.2.2 One coalition
In this section we analyse the case in which only one coalition is present in
the industry. The game is solved as previously.
lemma 4. Equilibrium prices of the coalition (p∗1) and the outsiders (p∗) are
given by : {
p∗1=
(1−γ)(2+2(Z−1)γ+2γk1)(2+(2Z−3)γ+2γk1)
A′
p∗= (1−γ)(2+2(Z−1)γ+2γk1)(2+2(Z−1)γ+γk1)
A
′
with
A
′
= 2γ2k21(4− 4γ + 3Zγ) + 2(1 + (Z − 1)γ)(2(2 + (Z − 3)γ)(1 + (Z − 1)γ)) +
γk1(2(8 + 5(Z − 2)γ)(1 + (Z − 1)γ)). 3
1In this case piout(7, 7, 2) > pi
C1
7 (K1 = 7,K2 = 7, Z = 2) =
piC2
7 (K1 = 7,K2 = 7, Z = 2)
so coalition is not profitable for the insiders.
2Proof : See lemma 2
3We check that A
′
> 0.
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The coalition will allow all its firms to be active whatever the number of
outsiders (proof is obtained by setting k2 = 0 in lemma 2).
proposition 6. There are two equilibria in this game :
K∗1 = 16, Z = 0
K∗1 = 6, Z = 10
So maximum concentration is again an equilibrium of this game (all the
firms belong to the coalition).
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have studied the optimal number of active firms in a coali-
tion and a merger. We have considered two kinds of game : a merger game
and a coalition game, both in the context of price competition with hori-
zontal product differentiation. These are two-stage games. The first stage
consists of determining the number of active firms. The second stage is price
competition between active firms. We assume that firms belonging to the
same owner or to the same coalition play cooperatively between themselves
but face competition between each other firm.
We show that when there is no competitive pressure (i.e. no outside firm)
then only merged equilibria can occur in the merger case. In the coalition
case we obtain a similar result in which the number of active firms in the
second stage is less than the initial number of firms.
Moreover, we show that when the competitive pressure is high enough
(Z ≥ 2) then the initial number of firms in the industry is the same as the
number of active firms in the last stage for each kind of game.
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Appendix A : Proof of lemma 1
Firms belonging to the same owner play in a cooperative way so the
maximization program of the owner M1 with k1 active firms is :
max
p
M1
1 ,p
M1
2 ,...,p
M1
k1
(piM1) (4)
where
piM1 =
k1∑
i=1
(pM1i − c)
1
1 + γ(k1 + k2 + Z − 1)× (5)
(6)1− 1 + γ(k1 + k2 + Z − 2)
1− γ p
M1
i +
γ
1− γ
∑
i 6=j
pM1j +
∑
j∈M2
pj +
∑
j∈out
pj

We stipulate j ∈ out the firms which are outsiders.
We obtain k1 First Order Conditions (FOC) which are symmetrical, so pM1i =
pM1 ,∀i ∈M1. After simplifications, we obtain the best response functions:
pM1(p−M1) =
1− γ + γ
∑
i/∈M1
(pi)
2 [1 + γ(k2 + Z − 1)] +
c
2
(7)
The best-reply function is symmetrical for the merger M2.
The maximization program of an outside firm is:
max
pi
(pi − c) 1
1 + γ
(
2∑
i=1
ki + Z − 1
)∗ (8)
(9)1−
1 + γ
(
2∑
i=1
ki + Z − 2
)
1− γ pi +
γ
1− γ
∑
j∈M1
pj +
∑
j∈M2
pj +
∑
{
j 6=i
j∈out
pj


As before, prices of outsiders are equal, we then replace, p∗i by p
out for all i /∈
(M1,M2). We obtain :
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pout(p−out) =
1− γ + γ(
∑
j∈M1
pj +
∑
j∈M2
pj + c[1 + γ(
2∑
i=1
ki + Z − 2)]
2[1 + γ(
2∑
i=1
ki + Z − 2)]− γ(Z − 1)
(10)
In order to simplify, we replace
(pM1(p−M1), pM2(p−M2), pout(p−out)) (11)
by
(p1, p2, p). (12)
The intersection of best response functions yields to :
p∗1=
(1−γ)+γ(k2p2+Zp)
2[1+γ(k2+Z−1)]
p∗2=
(1−γ)+γ(k1p1+Zp)
2[1+γ(k1+Z−1)]
p∗= (1−γ)+γ(k1p1+k2p2)2[1+γ(k1+k2+Z−2)]−γ(Z−1)
Appendix B : Proof of proposition 1
Numerical simulation gives the number of active firms in the merger M2 in
order having k∗1 < K1.
γ =0.5 γ =0.9
Z= k2 ≥ k2 ≥
0 11 1
1 17 8
2 23 14
3 30 20
4 36 26
5 42 33
This table can be read in this way :"for Z=3 and γ = 0.9, k2 must be higher
than 20 to piM1 have an interior maximum (k∗1 < K1)". Note that for γ =0.1, k2
must be very high for merged entity M1 have a maximum.
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Appendix C : Proof of lemma 2
Table 1: Reaction functions of the two mergers for Z = 1
K1 K2 k1 k2 pi
M1 piM2
1 14 1 14 0.004226 0.024267
2 13 2 13 0.004656 0.016495
3 12 2.19 12 0.004818 0.015507
4 11 2.36 11 0.005013 0.014701
5 10 2.61 10 0.005255 0.013668
6 9 3.02 9 0.005562 0.012277
7 8 3.8 8 0.005965 0.010335
8 7 8 3.8 0.010335 0.005965
9 6 9 3.02 0.012277 0.005562
10 5 10 2.61 0.013668 0.005255
11 4 11 2.36 0.014701 0.005013
12 3 12 2.19 0.015507 0.004818
13 2 13 2 0.016495 0.004656
14 1 14 1 0.024267 0.004226
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Table 2: Reaction functions of the two mergers for Z = 0
K1 K2 k1 k2 k1 k2
1 15   0.156969 15
2 14 2 0.247657 0.157632 14
3 13 3 0.203337 0.158403 13
4 12 4 0.186461 0.159311 12
5 11 5 0.177512 0.160394 11
6 10 6 0.171958 0.161711 10
7 9 7 0.168174 0.163346 9
8 8 8 0.165428 0.165428 8
9 7 9 0.163346 0.168174 7
10 6 10 0.161711 0.171958 6
11 5 11 0.160394 0.177512 5
12 4 12 0.159311 0.186461 4
13 3 13 0.158403 0.203337 3
14 2 14 0.157632 0.247657 2
15 1 15 0.156969  
For Z = 0 and Ki > 1,∀i = 1, 2, two cases are possible for each structure
(K1,K2).
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Appendix D : Proof of proposition 4
A cartel is stable if it satisfies a property of both internal and external stability.
Internal stability
Internal stability implies that no cooperating firm in a coalition finds it desirable
to become independant or to rejoin the other coalition. So internal stability for
Ci,∀i = 1, 2, is given by :
1
Ki
piCi(Ki,Kj , Z) >

piout(Ki − 1,Kj , Z + 1)
and
1
Kj+1
piCj (Ki − 1,Kj + 1, Z)
External stability
External stability implies that no independent firm finds it desirable to join a
cartel. So external stability is given by :
piout(K1,K2, Z) >

1
K1+1
piC1(K1 + 1,K2, Z − 1)
and
1
K2+1
piC2(K1,K2 + 1, Z − 1)
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